SENIT 8 of 2025: standards for comprehensive reparation in the non-punitive route of the JEP

In Interpretative Ruling TP-SA SENIT 8 of 2025, the Appeals Section (SA) of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) ruled on appeals filed, among others, by this legal representation, against decisions of the Chamber for the Definition of Legal Situations (SDSJ) that had linked non-selected defendants as those ultimately responsible for the project Works, Projects, and Activities with Reparative-Restorative Content (TOAR).

SENIT 8 establishes rules on the obligations of the State and the defendants in matters of reparation, as well as the powers of the SDSJ to evaluate and grade the commitment to compliance with the strict conditionality regime (RCE). It consolidates the centrality of harm and the participation of victims in transitional justice and in the non-punitive route.

1. Obligations of the State and those appearing before the court

The State must implement public policy that allows those appearing before the JEP to fulfill their obligation to contribute to reparation. The national government must guarantee the institutional provision of plans, programs, and projects for reparations to victims of the armed conflict in accordance with Law 1448 of 2011, the SNARIV, and within the framework of the Final Peace Agreement, in the Territorially Focused Development Plans (PDET) and the Comprehensive Collective Reparations Plans (PIRC).

Those appearing before the JEP, in compliance with the strict conditionality regime, have an obligation to contribute to the reparation of victims and the restoration of the damage caused.

There have been delays and difficulties in the implementation of the JEP's Restorative System due to:

i) insufficient inter-institutional coordination;

ii) lack of clarity in the distribution of institutional powers within the Executive Branch for the implementation of restorative activities;

iii) the absence of identification, adaptation, and implementation of the government's offer to enforce the aforementioned measures, within the framework of the JEP's jurisdictional functions;

iv) the lack of victim participation in the structuring and execution of the TOARs, which gives rise to this decision; and

v) the absence of government funding for restorative projects that already have a feasibility study.

Agreement AOG No. 006 of February 13, 2025, establishes the “(...) guidelines and criteria for the development of the Internal Coordination Route in the identification, promotion, and implementation of restorative initiatives, plans, programs, and projects (IPPPR) in response to the needs of judicial processes.” This Agreement establishes the internal coordination bodies, principles, criteria, and routes for the processing of such initiatives.

2. Powers of the SDSJ and criteria for assessing the RCE and grading obligations

The SDSJ must define the applicable procedural route, which may be:

• Granting of definitive non-punitive criminal treatment, when the defendant has fully complied with the RCE.
     
• Imposition of additional reparations obligations to access or maintain the benefit, if the contribution of truth or reparation is insufficient.
  
• Denial of the benefit and adoption of other procedural measures when there is non-compliance with the Strict Conditionality Regime.

To define the scope of the RCE and grade its conditions, it must evaluate the effectiveness of the defendant's contribution and their degree of commitment to the Comprehensive System, and may impose more stringent conditions for accessing or maintaining benefits; and grant the definitive benefit to those who meet the more stringent standard. It will consider:

• Timely and accurate presentation of the Clear, Concrete, and Programmed Commitment (CCCP).
     
• Exhaustiveness of the contribution to the full truth according to their legal situation.
  
• Valuable collaboration with the mechanisms of the Comprehensive System for Peace.
  
• Timely attention to the requirements of the judiciary and victims.
  
• Active participation in reparative acts, preferably in areas where the events took place or where there is a high concentration of victims.
  
• Compliance with judicial decisions in transitional justice.
     
• Assess contributions to the truth before defining reparative obligations, to determine whether an additional contribution is required.

3. Exceptional linkage to a TOAR

Reparative Work, Projects, or Activities (TOAR) are generally reserved for specific sanctions.

The SDSJ may exceptionally link non-selected defendants to access or maintain definitive benefits, considering:

• Quantitative element: number of incidents and victims.
  
• Qualitative element: severity and representativeness of the incidents, and circumstances of vulnerability of the victims with an intersectional approach.

Exclusion criteria:

•  Prosecution for a single offense (opting for measures other than TOAR).
     
• Physical or cognitive limitations that prevent compliance.
     
• Other criteria that ensure effectiveness and speed, such as socioeconomic or family conditions.

4. Assessment of damage, correspondence between reparation and damage caused, and guarantees for victim participation

•  Reparation obligations under the RCE must be based on the harm caused.
     
• The SDSJ must start from the SRVR's findings on the harm and consider the special participants in the macro-case to be accredited.
     
• The following will be assessed: core harm, main crimes, victim profiles, impacts, violated rights, affected territories, persistence of factors of violence and poverty.
     
• There must be territorial proximity between the damage and the reparative measures.
     
• The SDSJ may resort to macro-victimization analysis, commissioning these studies from the JEP's Information Analysis Group (GRAI).
     
• Victims' participation must be effective, continuous, and cross-cutting, from the assessment of damage to the graduation of the RCE.

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